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Case No. 20060128-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
David Leon Bunting, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004). 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was the police officer's traffic stop of defendant supported by reasonable 
suspicion where he observed that one of defendant's tail lights was dimmer than the 
other and pink rather than red in color? 
Standard of Review. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear 
error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 11,100 P.3d 1222. It's legal conclusions, 
including its application of the law to the underlying facts, are reviewed non-
deferentially for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,115,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1601(l)(a) (West Supp. 2005) 
(l)(a) A person may not operate or move and an owner may not 
cause or knowingly permit to be operated or moved on a highway a 
vehicle or combination of vehicles which: 
* * * 
(ii) does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped 
with lamps and other equipment in proper condition and 
adjustment as required in this chapter; 
(iii) is equipped in any manner in violation of this chapter; or 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1604(2) (West Supp. 2005) 
(2) (a) A motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer, and any other 
vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles, 
shall be equipped with at least two tail lamps and two or more red 
reflectors mounted on the rear. 
(b)(i) Except as provided under Subsections (2)(b)(ii), (2)(c), and 
Section 41-6a-1612, all stop lamps or other lamps and reflectors 
mounted on the rear of a vehicle shall display or reflect a red color. 
* * * 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1618(l) (West Supp. 2005) 
(1) Except as provided under Subsection (2), a person may not use, 
have for sale, sell, or offer for sale for use on or as a part of the 
equipment of a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, or pole trailer any 
head lamp, auxiliary fog lamp, rear lamp, signal lamp, required 
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reflector, or any parts of that equipment which tend to change the 
original design or performance, unless the part or equipment complies 
with the specifications adopted under Section 41- 6a-1601. 
(2) The provisions of Subsection (1) do not apply to equipment in 
actual use prior to July 1, 1979 or to replacement parts of this 
equipment. 
(3) A person may not use on a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, or 
pole trailer any lamps under this section unless the lamps are mounted, 
adjusted, and aimed in accordance with this part. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged by Information with possession of a controlled 
substance in a drug-free zone, possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, 
and driving on a revoked driver's license. R. 2-1. Following a preliminary hearing, 
the case was bound over for trial. R. 15. Defendant thereafter moved to suppress 
the evidence, arguing that the officer's perception of the color of defendant's tail 
light was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. R. 23-26. After hearing 
argument, the trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 32-31,52-49,75. Pursuant 
i 
to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, 
reduced to a third degree felony, and the remaining charges were dismissed R. 45-
38. In pleading guilty, defendant reserved his right to appeal the trial court's order 
denying his motion to suppress. R. 42. The court sentenced defendant to an 
indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five years. R. 55. The court suspended the 
sentence and placed defendant on 36 months of supervised probation. R. 55-54. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 68. 
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Summary of Facts 
While on patrol just after midnight on April 19,2005, Officer Craig Martinez 
observed defendant driving a white van westbound on 400 North Street in Orem, 
Utah. R. 74: 5-6. Officer Martinez noticed that the right taillight "appeared to be 
pink rather than red" and "was much dimmer than the left taillight." R. 74: 6. 
Officer Martinez stopped the van based on the faulty-looking taillight and disovered 
that the tail lamp was broken and covered with a red plastic folder. R. 74: 6, 10. 
Defendant gave Officer Martinez an Arizona driver's license. R. 74:6. A computer 
check verified that the Arizona license was valid. R. 74: 6. However, it also 
indicated that defendant had a Utah license that had been revoked less than three 
weeks earlier for an alcohol violation. R. 74:6. Officer Martinez arrested defendant 
for driving on a revoked license. R. 74:7. In a search of defendant's person incident 
to arrest, Officer Martinez discovered a glass pipe in defendant's left front pocket. 
R. 74: 7. In a search of defendant's van incident to arrest, he discovered additional 
paraphernalia and a plastic spoon with "a half gram of meth." R. 74: 8. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in relying on the officer's 
"subjective perception" that defendant's tail lamp was pink in color and dimmer 
than the other tail lamp. This argument lacks merit. Although an officer's 
subjective intentions and motives are irrelevant in assessing the reasonableness of a 
search or seizure, a court may properly consider an officer's subjective 
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determinations of fact, such as the color of a light The officer's observations here 
supported a reasonable suspicion that defendant violated the Utah Traffic Code. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE OFFICER 
HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
BASED ON THE OFFICER'S OBSERVATION THAT 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TAIL LAMP WAS PINK IN COLOR AND 
DIMMER THAN THE LEFT TAIL LAMP 
In its written ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court 
noted that counsel for defendant placed a flashlight behind the red folder that was 
the same color of the folder covering defendant's tail lamp on April 19,2005. R. 51. 
The court found that the light emitted during the demonstration "was, in fact, red." 
R. 51. The court observed that the red color emitted during the demonstration "was 
contrary to the officer's observation [on April 19,2005] of a pink hue". R. 51. The 
court noted that the State objected to the in-court demonstration as evidence and 
urged the court to limit its findings to the officer's testimony. R. 51. The court 
"agree[d] with the State's position and [found] that although the folder was red, the 
tape was red, and the light emitted from via [sic] the use of the flashlight was red, 
the Court is limited by the officer's observation." R. 52. 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in "f[inding] that the 
officer's subjective perception of the tail lamp coloring was controlling despite the 
[c]ourt's findings that the taillight was in conformance with statutory 
requirements." Aplt. Brf. at 10. Defendant contends that the trial court should not 
have relied on "the officer's subjective perception of the tail lamp coloring," but was 
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instead bound by its "own objective observation" of the coloring. Aplt. Brf. at 10, 
15. Defendant's argument lacks merit. 
At the outset, the trial court did not find that "the taillight was in 
conformance with statutory requirements." Aplt. Brf. at 10. The court found that 
the light emitted in the demonstration was red. R. 51. It did not find that the taillight 
was red or otherwise in conformance with applicable standards. 
Defendant suggests that in sustaining the prosecutor's objection to the 
demonstration, the trial court erroneously concluded that an "officer's perceptions 
are not subject to review" and it was thus "bound by the officer's subjective beliefs." 
Aplt. Brf. at 11. That was not the reason. 
Although the trial court did not explain the reason for sustaining the objection 
in its written ruling, see R. 52-50, it did so at the suppression hearing. The court first 
asked whether "there [was] any question as to the testimony of the officer that it 
was simply one was dimmer than the other and pinker than the other." R. 75: 5. 
The prosecutor responded, "There's no contrary evidence, to the State's 
knowledge." R. 75: 5. Defense counsel likewise responded, "I agree there's no 
contrary—or nothing to contradict that." The court then ruled: 
Well, despite the fine demonstration by Mr. Carter, I can't be sure 
that is an accurate representation of what happened that night; and so I 
have to rely upon the testimony of the only witness I had, who was the 
officer, who testified that what he saw was one light that was 
considerably dimmer than the other, that it was not showing a red 
color; 
So I find based on testimony that I have in front of me upon which I 
can rely, casting aside the rather unscientific demonstration, that I must 
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rely upon the testimony of the officer, which was that the light was 
enough dimmer; that it was not red in color; that it was more pink in 
color. 
Despite—and I make this ruling. Despite all of the explanations in 
Mr. Carter's motion about various colors and hues, but I've got what I 
got; and that's all I have. That it was a lighter color, it was dimmer; 
and I find that that did constitute [reasonable suspicion] 
R. 75: 5-6. 
The court thus discounted the demonstration not because the court believed it 
was necessarily bound by the officer's testimony, but because the demonstration 
was not reliable. It did not sufficiently duplicate the conditions on April 19,2005 so 
as to create an "accurate representation" of the taillight's color when Officer 
Martinez observed it.1 Accordingly, the court correctly observed that it was left only 
with the testimony of Officer Martinez. As conceded by defense counsel, there was 
"nothing [else] to contradict that" testimony. R. 75: 5. Although defendant could 
have testified otherwise, he did not take the witness stand. The trial court's reliance 
on the officer's testimony was proper. 
1
 At the suppression hearing, the trial court noted that Officer Martinez 
testified that the red plastic folder introduced at the preliminary hearing as 
Defendant's Exhibit 1 was "something like" the red folder which covered 
defendant's taillight, not necessarily the "exact" folder. R. 75: 3; accord R. 74: 11 
(officer testifying that the covering over defendant's tail lamp "appear[ed] to be 
something like" Exhibit 1 and was "very similar" to it). The color emitted from the 
flashlight depends on whether the red plastic is folded into four layers (as presently 
constituted in Exhibit 1) or not folded at all. Officer Martinez did not testify 
regarding the manner in which the plastic covered the tail lamp and the record does 
not indicate in what condition the plastic was when defense counsel placed the 
flashlight behind it. 
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Citing decisions from the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme 
Court, and this Court, defendant argues that the trial court nevertheless erred in 
relying on the officer's "subjective perception" of the taillight's color. Aplt. Brf. at 
10. The cases cited by defendant do not support that proposition. 
The cases cited by defendant support the well-settled principle that the 
reasonableness of police conduct is judged against an objective standard. See Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21-22 (1968); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S 128,137 (1978); State v. 
Warren, 2003 UT 36,114,78 P.3d 590; State v. Royball, 716 P.2d 291,293 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985); State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225,1228 
(Utah App. 1997). Under this standard, an officer's motive for acting is irrelevant. 
See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding that searches are examined "without regard to the 
underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved"); accord Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 1943,1948 (2006) (holding that "[t]he officer's subjective motivation 
is irrelevant"). An officer's subjective understanding of the legal justification for 
acting is also irrelevant. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding that "the fact that the 
officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which 
provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action 
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action"); accord 
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,153 (2004) (same); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806,813 (1996) (same); United States v. Robinson, 4tU U.S 218,236 (1973) (holding that 
"it is of no moment that [the officer]... did not himself suspect that respondent was 
armed"). 
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The foregoing cases do notsuggest that an officer's perception of facts is 
irrelevant in the court's objective assessment of reasonableness. To the contrary, the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Devenpeck held that "an officer's state of mind (except for the 
facts that he knows) is irrelevant" under the objective standard. 543 U.S. at 153 
(emphasis added). In Warren, the Utah Supreme Court likewise recognized that 
courts may consider an officer's "subjective factual determination[s]" when applying 
the objective test. 2003 UT 36, % 20 (emphasis added). The objective test requires 
the court to identify the facts known to the officer and then undertake "an objective 
assessment of [the] officer's actions in light of [those] facts." Scott, 543 U.S. at 137 
(emphasis added). 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41,107 P.3d 706, is also 
misplaced. See Aplt. Brf. at 13-14. In Chism, an officer stopped a vehicle and 
observed evidence that defendant and the other occupants were in possession of 
tobacco. 2005 UT App 41, \ 3. Suspecting that Chism was not old enough to legally 
possess tobacco, the officer asked him for identification. Id. at 14. Chism's driver's 
license indicated that he was in fact 19 years old. Id. Although the license 
"appeared to be valid and the picture on the license appeared to be Chism's," the 
officer further detained defendant to run a computer check so as to verify the 
validity of the license. Id. at \ \ 4,17. 
This Court held that defendant's extended detention to enable the officer to 
run a computer check on the license was unreasonable. The court held that Chism's 
driver's license "provide [d] what amounts to a rebuttable presumption of the 
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bearer's true age." Id. at 1 19. The Chism court did not conclude, however, that "the 
officer's personal impression of the defendant's age was irrelevant," as defendant 
asserts here. Aplt. Brf. at 13-14. To the contrary, the Court recognized that "a 
discrepancy between an identification card and an officer's observations might 
support a reasonable suspicion that the identification is false." Chism, 2005 UT App 
41, % 19. The problem in Chism was that the officer "provided no objective facts to 
support his suspicion that Chism was younger than his identification stated." Id. at 
1 20. The Court held that "[w]ithout such supporting facts, [the officer's] theory 
that Chism's identification was false [could] only be characterized as an 'inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch' not justifying additional detention." Id. 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). 
In this case, there was no evidence at the scene akin to the driver's license in 
Chism that would create a rebuttable presumption that defendant's tail lamp emitted 
a red light, as required under the Traffic Code. Nor did defense counsel's 
demonstration at the suppression hearing create such a presumption. As noted by 
the trial court, the demonstration was insufficient to assure the court of an "accurate 
representation of what happened that night." R. 75: 5. In any event, unlike the 
officer in Chism, the officer here identified specific and articulable facts to support 
his suspicion that the tail lamp did not comply with the Traffic Code, i.e., the right 
tail lamp "appeared to be pink rather than red" and "was much dimmer than the 
left taillight." R. 74: 6. 
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Defendant argues that a dim or pink tail lamp does not create a reasonable 
suspicion of a traffic violation. Aplt. Brf. at 10-11. Defendant reasons that because 
pink is a lighter shade of red, a tail lamp emitting a pink color does not violate the 
statute. Aplt. Brf. at 11. He also contends that a dim tail lamp does not violate the 
Code. Aplt. Brf. at 11. This argument fails. 
Except for a limited number of exceptions inapplicable here, "all stop lamps 
or other lamps and reflectors mounted on the rear of a vehicle shall display or reflect 
a red color." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-l604(2)(b)(i) (West 2004). By its plain terms, 
the statute requires that tail lamps be red in color. Had the legislature intended to 
permit shades or hues of red, it would have required that tail lamps display a 
"shade of red" or a "red hue." Although pink is a light shade of red, it is readily 
distinguishable from the red color. 
In any event, the Traffic Code provides that "[a] person may not operate or 
move . . . on a highway a vehicle . . . which . . . is not at all times equipped with 
lamps and other equipment in proper condition . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 41-61a-
1601(l)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2005). It also prohibits the use of rear lamps "which tend 
to change the original design or performance" of that part. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-
1618(1) (West Supp. 2005). Where Officer Martinez observed a right tail lamp that 
was both dimmer and different in color than the left tail lamp, he had a reasonable 
basis to believe that the right tail lamp was not in "proper condition" and did not 
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conform to the "original design or performance," as required under the Traffic 
Code.2 
* * * 
In sum, the trial court properly relied on Officer Martinez's testimony that the 
right tail lamp was dimmer than the left tail lamp and was pink in color rather than 
red. These facts created a reasonable suspicion that operation of the vehicle violated 
sections 41-6a-1601,41-6a-1604, and 41a-61-1618 of the Utah Traffic Code. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18,110,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between 
the litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Cat, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 
(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided 
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
2
 The Official Vehicle Safety Inspection Manual for Passenger Vehicles and 
Light Duty Trucks 2006 (SIM) requires safety inspectors to reject a safety inspection 
when "[r]ear lenses do not produce red light or are covered by any lense covers." 
SIM at 51. The Manual also indicates that u[l]enses that are patched, taped or covered 
with a temporary substance and lenses that have been equipped with any tinted covers 
MUST BE REJECTED/' SIM at 51 (emphasis in original). 
12 
Respectfully submitted September 25,2006. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
S. Gray 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Ff LP n 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
.Deputy i-zu-JH 
SHELDEN CARTER (0589) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPT. 
—oooOooo— 
STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS AND ORDERS RE: 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
vs. 
LEON DAVID BUNTING 
Defendant. 
Case 051401669 
—oooOooo— 
The defendant motioned the Court to suppress evidence. The defendant argued 
that the officer herein did not have sufficient cause to stop the defendant. The defendant 
asserted that this was a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights as secured by 
both the Federal and State Constitutions. 
Officer Martinez testified at the preliminary hearing that he had initiated a traffic 
stop of the defendant's van on April 19, 2005. The sole basis to make the stop was van's 
taillight. He testified that after midnight at 12:45 he noted a van traveling westbound on 
400 North in Orem City. 
He noted the right taillight was dimmer than the left taillight and appeared to be 
pinkish. The officer than requested his driver's license, registration and insurance. The 
d§2 
officer checked the license and noted it being valid in Arizona but his license had been 
revoked in Utah. 
The officer than arrested Mr. Bunting. Pursuant to the search of Mr. Bunting, he 
found a glass pipe in his left front pocket and noticed the pipe to have white residue in it. 
Additional contraband was then later located in the van. 
Upon cross-examination, the officer described the right taillight has having red 
folder tape over the right tail lamp with also red tape. This was also indicated by the 
officer's report. The officer did not testify relating neither to any dangers that the taillight 
presented nor to any other defects in the equipment upon the van. The officer did not 
indicated that he could not see the taillight but that it did not match the left taillight in 
coloring. The difference in the coloring of the two taillights was the only basis for the 
stop. 
The defense then introduced an exhibit which was the red folder that had been 
placed over the taillight. It was the same coloring as the officer noted that evening. 
The officer suggested that the red folder with the red tape produced a pinkish hue. 
After the defense filed a motion to suppress, the Court set a motion hearing on the 
suppression issue. At the hearing, the defense placed a flashlight behind the red folder 
and the light emitted was, in fact, red. This was contrary to the officer's observation of a 
pink hue. 
The State objected to the exhibition of the light emitted from the red folder and 
argued the only evidence the Court had before it was the officer's testimony. The State 
argued that the Court is limited in its findings by the officer's testimony and the Court 
must disregard the coloring of the light emitted via the flashlight to the red folder. The 
Court was thereby bound by the officer's testimony. 
The Court agrees with the State's position and finds that although the folder was 
red, the tape was red, and the light emitted from via the use of the flashlight was red, the 
Court is limited by the officer's observation. 
Pursuant to these findings, the Court denies the defendant's motion to suppress. 
The Court rules that since the officer noted a pinkish hue to the taillight, the officer was 
justified in making this traffic stop and the resulting discovery of contraband is 
admissible into evidence and not a violation of the defendant's rights as guaranteed under 
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art I Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution. , -, 
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